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In

the literatureon strategicalliances,trustis often positionedas the magic ingredientin alliance
success.Typically,trustis treatedin the literatureas a residualtermin the statisticalmodels,neither
operationalizednor measured.This paperis importantbecauseit operationalizesand measurestrustas
a multidimensional
construct,whichis bothcausallyantecedentto strategicalliance,flexibility,andthe
outcomeof characteristics
of the alliancepartners.I believethefieldneedsmoretheoreticalandempirical
precisionregardingtrust,as exemplifiedin this paper.
MitchellP. Koza

Abstract
Utilizing a model drawn from both transaction cost economics
and social exchange theory, we analyze determinants of strategic flexibility in a sample of strategic alliances involved in
joint development agreements or joint research pacts. Findings
indicate that, in general, determinants suggested by transaction
cost economics provided flexibility in modification and inflexibility in exit. From social exchange theory, trust was found to
be positively related to both types of flexibility while another
component of social exchange theory, dependence, was found
to be negatively related to the strategic flexibility of the alliance.
Results also found that factors suggested by both transaction
cost economic theory and social exchange theory were related
to the concept of trust. Economic constraints as suggested by
transaction cost economics were positively related to trust between the alliance partners while dependence was negatively
related to trust. Additionally, the quality of communication and
the existence of shared values were positively related to trust
between the exchange partners. Results provide support for the
role of determinants from both transaction cost economics and
social exchange theory in the flexibility of strategic alliances.

(Strategic Alliances; Flexibility; Trust)

The emergence of new global competitors, the convergence of high-technology industries, and the increasing

speed and cost of technological development promise an
increasingly uncertain environment for firms (Hagedoom
and Schakenraad 1994). These dynamic competitive
forces call for organizations to be efficient, innovative,
and flexible (Duncan 1976), suggesting that processes for
ensuring strategic flexibility may be a crucial element of
strategic management (Evans 1991). This may be particularly true in fast-paced industries or hypercompetitive
environments characterized by rapid technological
change, shortened product life cycles, increasing competitive rivalry, and global competition (Volberda 1996).
Many organizations have found that it is almost impossible to address these competitive forces without some
major internal and external structural adjustments that
provide greater strategic flexibility.
Faced with greater environmental uncertainty, firms
may want to avoid long entanglements that could prove
to be wrong later and will instead favor more flexible,
less binding relationships (Crocker and Masten 1988)
such as strategic alliances. Interorganizationalrelationships such as strategic alliances provide the firm with
greater ability to pursue new developments in technologies, products, and markets and thus allow it to initiate
or adapt to competitive change (Volberda 1996). Porter
and Fuller (1986) argue that partnerships and collaborations are a more rapid means of competitive repositioning
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than internal development, and are less costly and more
flexible than mergers. Similarly, Balakrishnan and Koza
(1995) view joint ventures as transitional, short-lived
strategies. Support for these argumentscomes from Kelly
and Amburgey (1991), who distinguish between core and
peripheral activities within a firm and provide evidence
that in uncertain situations where change may be necessary, the firm will benefit by utilizing peripheraldevices,
such as strategic alliances.
The rate of alliance formation has increased, particularly in high-technology industries where R&D is characterized by substantial uncertainty (Hagedoorn and
Schakenraad 1992). And yet, research examining alliance
formation and failure have found that anywhere from
30%-70% of alliances are considered failures by one or
more of the partners or break up prematurely (Fortune
1992). As such, increasing scholar attention on the subject of strategic alliances has led to research examining
the motives for collaboration (Hladik 1988, Oliver 1990)
and the governance structure of these alliances (Gulati,
1995, Zaheer and Venkatraman 1995), as well as the factors that lead to their success (Mohr and Spekman 1994,
Parkhe 1993), stability (Anderson and Weitz 1989; Heide
and John 1988, 1990), or continuity (Olk and Young
1997).
As a result of the failure of many alliances, understanding the factors related to their success or continuity has
become an importantsubject of investigation. Because of
the rapidity and frequency with which environmental
changes occur, the benefit or success of a strategic alliance may be closely associated with its strategic flexibility and the ability to adjust the relationship to changes,
including the timely termination of the relationship when
the alliance no longer meets the partners' needs
(Niederkofler 1991). Thus, the flexibility of a strategic
alliance has been argued to be one of the key factors
related to the success or "usefulness" of an alliance (e.g.,
Porter and Fuller 1986, Harrigan, 1986). However, because few studies have been systematically designed to
study flexibility in a strategic alliance setting
(Fiegenbaum and Kamani 1991), there appears to be a
need to examine the underlying factors that lead to strategic alliance flexibility.
This study attempts to address these shortcomings by
utilizing a comprehensive framework wherein both transaction cost economics and social exchange theory are
used to examine two elements of strategic flexibility in
strategic alliances: the flexibility to modify the alliance
and the flexibility to exit the alliance relationship when
the alliance is performing poorly. This model is investigated within a sample of strategic alliances representing
joint development or joint research pacts on information
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technology. Analytical techniques are utilized that allow
for the simultaneous estimation of the relationship between underlying factors suggested by transaction cost
economics and social exchange theory and the flexibility
of a strategic alliance.

Determinants of Strategic Alliance
Flexibility
Strategic Flexibility
In a dynamic and turbulent environment, strategic decisions may need to be continually reexamined. Responding to a wide variety of changes in the competitive environment necessitates an adaptive capability or
flexibility on the part of the organization (Volberda
1996). Strategic flexibility is generally considered to be
a construct with multiple dimensions (Evans 1991) and
has been defined as the ability to adapt to environmental
changes (Aaker and Macarenhas 1984), to change game
plans (Harrigan 1985), to precipitate intentional changes,
to continuously respond to unanticipated changes, and to
adjust to the unexpected consequences of predictable
changes (Bahrami 1992).
In the strategic alliance literature,two general types of
flexibility have been specified: modification and exit. The
first, modification, refers to the ability of partners to adjust their behaviors or the terms of the agreement in response to changes in the environment or to the needs of
their partners (e.g., Heide and John, 1992). Given
bounded rationality,it is impossible to contractuallyspecify every possible contingency involved in managing a
strategic alliance (Williamson 1985). Thus, the eventual
viability and success of the alliance may depend on the
ability of partners to observe and respect informal obligations of the relationship and to modify the terms of the
alliance (formal or informal) for continued value creation.
The second type of strategic flexibility is the relative
ease of exit from an alliance in which the partner is no
longer satisfied or that no longer meets the partner's
needs. According to Harrigan and Newman (1990), the
needs and strengths of each partnerin a joint venture are
subject to constant change. These changes, then, often
enhance or diminish that partner's interest in the alliance's activities. As such, the flexibility to be able to terminate or exit from the relationship becomes an important
strategic concern for individual partnersin alliances.

Determinants of Strategic Flexibility
Two theoretical perspectives were utilized in developing
models of strategic flexibility-transaction cost economics and social exchange theory. Transactioncost economics has been found to be a useful theoretical perspective
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from which to examine many facets of strategic alliances,
including structure (Gulati 1995), continuity (Olk and
Young 1997), and stability or survival (Parkhe 1993). According to transaction cost theory, partners within strategic alliances are assumed to have the potential for opportunistic behavior. Thus, it is necessary to secure
commitment to the alliance through the investment of
specific assets and other types of economic "hostages"
(Parkhe 1993, Williamson 1985).
While economic theories have been used to explain
intra- and interorganizational phenomena, there is currently a growing debate between economists and behavioralists about the extent to which economic analyses
alone extend our knowledge of organizations (Barney
1990, Donaldson 1990). Organizationtheorists have challenged the assumptions underlying economic models that
often overlook trust and power and exaggerate the influence of opportunism in organizations (Jones 1983,
Perrow 1981). Consequently, although economic models
have predominantly been used to examine the nature of
strategic alliances, researchershave argued that social exchange theory may be a more useful theoretical perspective for the investigation of strategic alliances (Graham
1988).
In addition to factors suggested by transactioncost economics, social exchange theorists consider it importantto
understandthe social context in which those decisions are
made (e.g., Cook 1977, Cook and Emerson 1978,
Granovetter 1985). Trust represents one such important
social context factor. As Granovetter explains, many attempts at rational, economic action are really "embedded"
in social relations, and he stresses "the role of concrete
personal relations and structures of such relationships in
generating trust and discouraging malfeasance" (1985, p.
490). In addition, the dependence of organizations on
each other as suggested by both social exchange theorists
(e.g., Blau 1964) and organization theorists (e.g., Pfeffer
and Salancik 1978) represents another important social
context factor.
Transactioncost economics and social exchange theory
together may provide a more comprehensive explanation
of the strategic flexibility of alliances. In addition, the
interrelationships among the theoretical determinants of
flexibility may provide an even more thorough understanding of strategic alliance flexibility.

Transaction Cost Economics and Strategic
Flexibility
According to transaction cost economics, the costs associated with various organizational structures constitute
the critical factor determining the choice of transacting
mode. Transaction cost theory has been used to address
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many issues related to strategic alliances, including commitment (e.g., Parkhe 1993) and stability (e.g., Heide and
John 1988, 1990). Partners within strategic alliances are
assumed to have the potential for opportunistic behavior
(Reich and Mankin 1986). Transaction cost economists
have recognized the proliferation of these intermediate
governance structures and suggest that they are maintained by economic weapons such as hostages and other
credible economic commitments. The effect of such economic commitments is to create a locked-in condition
(Katz 1989) which in turn promotes behaviors that ensure
the continuance and "mutualforbearance"of the partnership (Buckley and Casson 1988). Specifically, economic
constraints such as the investment of specific assets and
hostage arrangements may be utilized to reduce the potential for opportunismby locking partnersinto a strategic
alliance with the expected long-term gains from maintaining the relationship exceeding the potential short-term
gains from opportunism or defection (Parkhe 1993,
Williamson 1985). We examine three factors suggested
by transaction cost economics as determinants of an alliance's flexibility: asset specificity, balanced asset specificity, and hostages.
Asset Specificity. Asset specificity refers to the nature
of the transferability of assets from one use to another.
"Specific assets are those whose value is less if switched
to alternative transactions and consequently whose value
is not fully salvageable if the relation breaks down"
(Lorenz 1988, p. 199). As assets are created or modified
for a particular use, they may have severely diminished
value in other settings. Thus, as Klein et al. (1978) have
argued, firms become locked into a course of action when
investments in specific assets have been made.
Asset specificity may serve to tie members together by
subverting the flexibility of pursuing other alternatives or
severing the interorganizationalrelationship. An organization may become locked in to an alliance with another
company as it devotes more assets to the relationship.
These idiosyncratic investments lose value upon transfer,
so exchange partners may become committed to making
the existing relationship succeed (Parkhe 1993,
Williamson 1985). This may be particularly true for intangible factors such as managerial skills and technical
know-how. Thus, intangible asset specificity should
prove to have a much more significant influence on the
strategic flexibility of the alliance. Consequently, firms
may find it in their own best interest to continue the relationship due to their investments in the alliance (Heide
and John 1992, Parkhe 1993). To protect these investments, firms may be more willing to be flexible in terms
of modifying the agreement rather than causing it to fail
by being unwilling to adjust.
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In an intraorganizationalcontext, specific assets have
been found to bind organizations to a particular strategy
or course of action. Ghemawat (1991) described this phenomenon as "lock-in." Assets created or purchased for
the purpose of a particularstrategic course of action may
not be easily transferable to other courses of action. As
such, these assets may lead to lock-in even when the alliance is no longer satisfying the partner.Lei and Slocum
(1992), for instance, argue that strategic alliances can
serve to increase dependence on other firms if the organization, through heavy involvement, gives away its own
skills and know-how without learning from the partner.
In the case where these commitments to the relationship
are based on contractual specifications or other economic
constraints, the flexibility to exit the relationship even
when it no longer fits the needs of the partner may be
difficult.
As a result of the above discussion, it is proposed that
the investment of specific assets into the alliance will be
positively related to flexibility in modifying the terms of
the alliance agreement, but negatively related to exit flexibility.
HYPOTHESIS 1a. Asset specificity is positively related
to the strategic flexibility of an alliance, measured in
terms of modification.
HYPOTHESIS lb. Asset specificity is negatively related to the strategicflexibility of an alliance, measured
in terms of exit.

Balanced Asset Specificity. Balanced asset specificity
refers to the extent to which each partnerhas contributed
equal levels of specific assets to the alliance. While previous research has separately examined the specificity of
the assets contributed by each partner to the exchange
(Zaheer and Venkatraman 1995), this study utilizes the
concept of balanced asset specificity that is a unique attribute of the dyadic relationships examined here. This
conceptualization of specific assets invested explores
more fully the mutual commitments that may exist between partnersin an alliance. One strategy for creating a
self-enforcing agreement is for both parties involved to
make "credible commitments" to the relationship
(Williamson 1985), for example, by means of investments in specific assets (Anderson and Weitz 1989) or
other relationships with the partner (Kogut 1989). Because alliances are mediated only partly through prices,
parties demand mutual commitments from their partners
in the form of alternative or complementary technology,
market information or access, as well as reputation or
credibility (Mody 1993). A dependence condition exists
(Barney and Ouchi 1986) which, if balanced, represents
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a mutual safeguard (Williamson 1985) and a collective
incentive to maintain the relationship.
The general incentive to maintain the relationship can
manifest itself in different ways. One specific outcome of
this balance of assets contributed is that the parties will
have a joint motivation to show "forbearance"(Buckley
and Casson 1988) or flexibility in response to changing
circumstances. The existence of balanced investments
serves to align the respective parties' interests and promotes flexibility as a means of preserving the relationship
(Heide 1994). Thus, it is proposed that the existence of
balanced asset specificity will be positively related to
flexibility in modifying the terms of the alliance agreement.
HYPOTHESIS 2. Balanced asset specificity is positively related to the strategic flexibility of an alliance,
measured in terms of modification.

Hostages. Hostage arrangements refer to the existence of other current relationships between the partners
to the focal alliance. These hostages are another type of
safeguard discussed in transaction cost economics as a
protection against a partner's opportunistic behavior
(Williamson 1983). The utilization of hostages as a safeguard implies that there is the possibility of penalties for
any opportunistic behavior on the part of the partnersinvolved. Researchers have argued that "mutual forbearance" (refraining from cheating) is necessary in maintaining strong currentrelations (e.g., Buckley and Casson
1988). The existence of other current relationships (i.e.,
hostages) is one method for facilitating that mutual forbearance. Hostages, then, can be in the form of other current alliances or the expectation of entering into other
relationships in the future.
Williamson (1985) proposed that organizations involved in more than one alliance with the same partners
have created a "mutual hostage" arrangement.Here, the
failure of one relationship may threaten the strength or
viability of others. Kogut (1989) provided empirical support for the strength of multiple ties. He found that involvement in more than one collaborative relationship led
to the stability of the focal joint venture.
As a result, alliance members with multiple currentrelationships among themselves are considered to have economic hostages and are less likely to sever the focal alliance relationship and are more likely to be willing to
modify the existing relationship in order to ensure its survival. Consequently, it is proposed that hostage arrangements (multiple relationships) will be positively related
to flexibility in modifying the alliance and will be negatively related to flexibility in exiting the alliance.
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HYPOTHESIS3a. The existence of hostage arrangements is positively related to the strategicflexibility of an
alliance, measured in terms of modification.
HYPOTHESIS3b. The existence of hostage arrangements is negatively related to the strategic flexibility of
an alliance, measured in terms of exit.

Social Exchange Theory and Strategic Flexibility
Social exchange theory suggests that two specific aspects
of organizational context may be influential in understanding the flexibility of relationships between organizations. First, that the trustbetween the organizations will
have a positive impact on the desire and ability of the
partners to adjust to changing environmental demands
through modification or termination of the agreement
(Lorenz 1988, Mody 1993). Second, that the dependence
of the partner on the alliance may also be an important
factor that influences the flexibility in using a strategic
alliance. In general, researchers have argued that dependency may serve to commit the partner to the alliance,
thereby increasing the longevity of the relationship
(Parkhe 1993).
Trust. Researchers in sociology and organization theory have emphasized the importance of trust in social and
economic exchange. While the study of trust has its roots
in psychology and social psychology and is intuitively an
interpersonal phenomenon, with many sociologists arguing that expectations of trust do ultimately reside
within individuals, many management scholars have
taken this idea of interpersonal trust and extended it to
the organizational level (e.g., Gulati 1995, Zaheer et al.
1998). Justification for this extension of interpersonal
trust to the organizational level comes from many
sources. For example, Ring and Van de Ven (1994) argue
that although the individuals within an organization may
be transitory, their role definitions are stable and enduring. The trust, then, may reside within the roles and routines of the organization and not necessarily with only the
individual. Recently, the concept of trusthas been utilized
in the study of joint ventures (e.g., Gulati 1995) and in
the marketing channels literatureto examine governance
(e.g., Zaheer and Venkatraman 1995) and commitment
(Morgan and Hunt 1994). Anderson and Narus (1990)
suggest that once trust is established, firms learn thatjoint
efforts will lead to outcomes that exceed what the firm
would achieve had they acted solely in their own best
interests.
While trust has been defined in many different ways to
address many different organizationalresearch questions,
one that is consistent with research on interorganizational
relationships is that of Dodgson (1993), who defined trust
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as a state of mind, an expectation held by one trading
partnerabout another, that the other will behave in a predictable and mutually acceptable manner. As suggested
by Koza and Lewin (1998), "for trust to be a useful concept its principle components must be identified, operationalized and measured" (p. 259). Thus, to capture the
multidimensionality of the concept of trust, similar to
Zaheer et al. (1998), we characterize trust as a construct
based on three components-dependability, predictability, and faith. Dependability refers to expectations that
the partner will act in the alliance's best interest, predictability refers to consistency of actions by the partner,
while faith refers to the belief that the partnerwill not act
opportunistically, even in unforeseen or novel situations.
It has been argued that trustis so importantto relational
exchange that it is considered to be a central feature of a
strategic partnership(Mohr and Spekman 1994). Because
investments in alliances entail a vulnerability, parties will
seek ways to partnerwith partnersthat exhibit characteristics of dependability and predictability, even in unforeseen situations (faith). In the literature on interorganizational relationships, there has been a somewhat consistent
argument that the existence of relationships based on the
trust between partnershas a positive impact on the ability
of the partners to adjust to changing environmental demands or unintended problems that may arise. For example, Lorenz (1988) argues that partnershipsthat exhibit
trust will survive greater stress and will display greater
adaptability. Similarly, in examining the evolution of cooperative arrangements,Doz (1996) found that alliances
that have developed trusting relationships over time are
more likely to be adaptable and to survive for longer periods of time. Thus, relationships based on trust, as measured by dependability, predictability, and faith, should
exhibit more flexibility in decision making and operations
than those that are not.
In addition, as the needs and strengths of each partner
in its major activities are subject to continual change, the
partners' interest in the strategic alliance may diminish.
If a relationship exhibits trust, but confronts dramatic
changes in the market indicating that the alliance should
be dissolved, partners may break up that particular alliance but form a new one (Mody 1993). As a result of the
arguments above, it is proposed that trust between organizations in an alliance, as indicted by the partner's perception of dependability, predictability, and faith, will be
positively related to flexibility in both modification and
exit.
HYPOTHESIS 4a. Trustis positively related to the strategic flexibility of an alliance, measured in terms of modification.

1999

This content downloaded from 206.211.139.182 on Mon, 10 Nov 2014 12:30:36 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

443

CANDACE YOUNG-YBARRA AND MARGARETHE WIERSEMA
HYPOTHESIS 4b. Trust is positively related to the
strategic flexibility of an alliance, measured in terms of
exit.

Dependence. In addition to trust, power and its corollary dependence are important elements in social exchange. Imbalances of obligations incurred in transactions produce differences in power and arise in the course
of competition for scarce goods (Blau 1964). According
to Blau (1964) power may be defined as:
... the capacity of an individual, or group of individuals, to
modify the conduct of other individuals or groups in the manner
which he desires, and to prevent his own conduct being modified
in the manner in which he does not. Power refers to all kinds
of influence between persons or groups, including those exercised in economic transactions (p.1 15).

By supplying demanded services to others, a person can
establish power over others. And, if those services cannot
be obtained elsewhere, dependence will emerge.
Social exchange theorists (e.g., Blau 1964) and organization theorists (e.g., Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) have
built on a model of "power-dependence" developed by
Emerson (1962). Resource dependence theory has argued
that an organization acts to reduce environmental uncertainty (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Uncertainty is generated by resource scarcity and by a lack of perfect knowledge about environmental fluctuations and availability of
exchange partners (Cook 1977). Under conditions of resource scarcity, one method for attaining the goal of uncertainty reduction is through the use of interorganizational exchanges (Levine and White 1961). An alliance
may be particularly important when no alternatives for
reduction of uncertainty or dependence are available. In
their study of the relationships and linkages in the health
care industry, Levine and White (1961) argued and found
that interdependence will be even greater for those organizations that do not have the ability to obtain their
resources and hence reduce their uncertainty outside of
the current network of relationships. In this case, the alliance may be sustained simply to help in uncertainty reduction, even though performance from the relationship
is not enhanced.
In examining the dependence of organizations on each
other, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argue that dependence
is made up of three elements: (1) importance of the resource being obtained, (2) the discretion of the use of the
resource, and (3) the absence of alternatives for obtaining
the resource. Building on this work, Heide and John
(1988), in their study of dependence balancing in marketing channels, expand the notion of fewer alternatives
to include both fewer currentalternatives as well as fewer
potential alternatives.
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The options approach proposed by Kogut (1991) develops the perspective that joint ventures are created as
"real options" to expand into future technological developments or markets. Because these options offer flexibility and increased opportunities for firms in following a
strategic course of action, firms often incur extra expense
just to keep alternatives open (Harrigan and Newman
1990). Multiple alternatives have the effect of reducing
an organization's dependence on any one alliance or
course of action. Additionally, although an organization
may have many alternatives open, economic constraints
make it likely that not all of the opportunities will be
pursued. Thus, the number of options available is likely
to affect the commitment to any one alliance. Those
members with more options available will have more
choices for investment and, consequently, will be less dependent on any one alliance and more likely to leave any
one alliance, especially when it no longer fits the strategic
need of the partner.Thus, dependence on any one alliance
will reduce the strategic flexibility firms have in exiting
the relationship.
Likewise, partnerships based on dependence may not
be conducive to flexibility in modifying the terms of the
agreement. When one party is dependent on the other, the
other is said to have power in the relationship (Emerson
1962). Because of this, the more powerful partner may
have no motivation to adjust to changes. Under this scenario, flexibility of the relationship may not be a result.
Thus, the dependence of the partner on the alliance will
be negatively related to the strategic flexibility of that
alliance, in terms of both modification and exit.
HYPOTHESIS 5a. Dependence is negatively related to
the strategicflexibility of an alliance, measured in terms
of modification.
HYPOTHESIS 5b. Dependence is negatively related to
the strategic flexibility of an alliance, measured in terms
of exit.

Sources of Trust
The construct, trust or trustworthybehavior, is a common
element in both transaction cost economics as well as
social exchange theory. Behavioral scholars have adopted
the assumption that most exchange partnersare trustworthy and that trust will exist in exchange relationships even
if economic safeguards against opportunism are not in
place. However, economic theorists argue that because
economic actors have the potential for opportunistic behavior, safeguards must be in place to ensure trustworthy
behavior (i.e., lack of opportunistic behavior). While this
lack of opportunistic behavior is not consistent with a
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social exchange theory view of trust which argues that
trust evolves out of past experience and current interaction (Deutsch 1973, Rempel et al. 1985) and is not the
result of economic hostages, both theories share a commonality. Trust, according to social exchange theory, and
lack of opportunistic behavior, according to transaction
cost economists, have reliability and predictability of action as a basis for their definitions.
Social Exchange Theory and Trust. Lewis and
Weigert (1985) contend that trust is characterized by a
cognitive "leap"of faith beyond the expectations that reason and experience alone would warrant. Thus, where
opportunism might be rationally expected, trust prevails.
It should be noted that hostage exchanges in the form of
specific assets or other types of economic hostages avoid
trustby structuringthe transactionalcontext in such a way
that opportunism becomes irrational. The importance of
this distinction is importantto our understandingof trust.
Trust, according to social exchange theorists, is not a result of contracts, credible commitments, or hostages because these require no "leap" and are actually more descriptive of situations requiring little or no trust. In other
words, activities can be coordinated through either contracts or trust or a combination, but the differences should
be kept clear.
The social exchange literature suggests that two main
sources of trust exist. One is a result of reputation while
the other resides in sharing similar values. The first, reputation, requires knowledge of previous relationships or
may develop over time as partners continue to interact.
The reputational source of trust involves both previous
relations and length of attachment. The second main
source of trust, shared values, requires only current
knowledge about one's partnerto the exchange and may
be transmittedthrough the currentexchange process. The
sharing of values involves communication as well as an
understanding of the goals and values of the partner.
Previous Relations. The knowledge that an organization can be trusted is based, in part, on that organization' s reputation.This reputationcan be established either
through previous relationships or alliances (e.g., Gulati
1995, Hladik 1988) or over time as the length of the attachment between the partnersincreases (Seabright et al.
1992). Shared experiences between firms can engender
trust among the partners, resulting in closer bonds. The
idea of trust and commitment emerging from priorcontact
has been a common theme in much of the literature involving social exchange and trust (e.g., Blau 1964, Cook
and Emerson 1978, Lewis and Weigert 1985, Luhman
1979, Zucker 1986), and has been examined in the literature at both the intraorganizational (e.g., McAllister
1995, Zand 1972) and interorganizational levels
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(Anderson and Weitz 1989, Gulati 1995, Hladik 1988,
Larson 1992, Parkhe 1993, Ring and Van de Ven 1992).
The implication of all of these studies is that trust develops between partners over time and is intimately tied to
past experiences. This firm-specific information concerning prior exchanges provides data about the trustworthiness of the exchange partner.Similarly, Ring and Van de
Ven (1992) propose that reliance on trust between organizations can be expected to emerge only when they have
successfully completed transactions in the past and they
perceive that the partner has acted equitably. Consequently, it is expected that the existence of previous relationships with the current partner is positively related
to trust.
HYPOTHESIS 6. The existence of previous relationships with any partner companies is positively related to
to trust among partners in a strategic alliance.

Attachment. Attachment refers to the prior history of
a particular exchange relationship. Similar to the arguments for previous relationships over time, as time goes
on in a relationship, partners come to know whether the
other partner can be trusted. Increased attachment has
been found to be positively related to commitment to the
relationship with the assumption being that, among other
things, trust has developed. Cook and Emerson (1978),
in their work on social exchange, argue that attachment
is a distinct attributeof interorganizationalrelationships.
Scanzoni (1979) argues that one reason why older dyads
continue is that experience breeds trust.Throughprevious
actions, a foundation is laid for trust. Seabright et al.
(1992) address the importance of attachments in interorganizational relationships. While not directly testing the
impact of attachmenton trust, their argumentis consistent
with that which specifies that trust develops over time.
Consequently, it is proposed that attachment will be positively related to trust. The longer the parties have been
together in a particular alliance, the more they will trust
each other.
HYPOTHESIS 7. Attachment between the partners to
the alliance is positively related to trust among partners
in a strategic alliance.

Communication. One factor leading to trust is the
level of communication between partners. Communication "can be defined broadly as the formal as well as informal sharing of meaningful and timely information between firms" (Anderson and Narus 1990, p. 44). Support
for the relationship between communication and trust exists in both intra- and interorganizationalresearch. Interaction frequency was found to be positively related to
affect-based trust (McAllister 1995) between managers
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and their peers. Lorenz (1988) argues that personal contact allows for easier exchange of information. This in
turn allows the partnersto learn about the other person's
idiosyncrasies and develop an understandingbetween the
parties. In short, communication allows for the exchange
of information such as shared values, goals, and objectives, key factors related to trust. Consequently, it is expected that communication (in quantity and quality) will
be positively related to trust.
8. The level and quality of communication between the partners in a strategic alliance is positively related to organizational level trust in the partner
company.
HYPOTHESIS

Shared Values. While reputation is an important indicator of the trustworthiness of an exchange partner, it
is by no means the only indicator. This assumes that partners have transactedin the past. Does this mean that there
is no trustpossible between those partnersexchanging for
the first time? Borrowing from the social-psychological
literature, trust can also be a function of a person's faith
in another. This faith is often a result of shared values
(Zucker 1986). Shared values refers to the extent that
partners to an exchange have common beliefs regarding
the importance of the motives for transacting as well as
the goals and objectives of the exchange. Dwyer et al.
(1987) theorize that shared values contribute to the development of commitment and trust in marketing relationships. Empirical support for this relationship between
shared values and both commitment and trust is found by
Morgan and Hunt (1994). Additionally, trust develops in
part as a result of a partner's interpretationof his or her
counterpart's motives and intentions (Kelley 1979).
Related to the idea of shared values is that of cultural
similarity. Zucker (1986) has proposed that one of the
three central modes of trust, character-basedtrust, relies
on social or cultural similarity. The argument is that others with social similarity may be sought out for exchanges
under the premise that many background understandings
will be common to parties to the exchange and, consequently, that the outcomes of the transactionwill be more
satisfactory to both parties. The background understandings she refers to are similar in concept to the shared
values and behavioral norms discussed above. Social similarity, she argues, allows norms to be shared across a
group of individuals or firms. With the exception of
Gulati (1995) who utilizes Zucker's (1986) theory of cultural similarity, little research has been done that examines the relationship between cultural similarity and trust
in strategic alliances. Gulati argues that domestic alliances should exhibit more trust, due to cultural similarity,
and would be less likely to need to use equity to structure
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the alliance relationship. While not specifically testing the
relationship between similarity and trust, he does find that
international alliances are more likely to be equity based
than domestic alliances.
Consequently, it is expected that the existence of
shared values between the organizations, in the form of
cultural similarity and sharing of goals and objectives,
will be positively related to trust.
HYPOTHESIS 9. The existence of shared values between the organizations is positively related to organizational level trust.

Transaction Cost Economics and Trust. In describing
trust, Williamson (1993) makes a distinction between calculative, personal, and institutional trust. The first, calculative, refers to a "rational form of trust fostered by
mutual hostages and other economic commitments." The
second, personal trust, does not depend on calculations of
self-interest for its formation or continuation, and applies,
according to Williamson, only in personal relationships.
Finally, institutional trust derives from the social and organizational embeddedness but in fact, according to
Williamson (1993) is calculative as well. Barney and
Hansen (1995) describe these first and third types of "calculative" trust as "semi-strong"trust and argue that when
the cost of opportunistic behavior is greater than its benefit, it will be in the rational self-interest of exchange
partnersto behave in a trustworthymanner. That is, trustworthy behavior and, consequently, trust between partners are a result of rational decision making in their own
economic interest. Similar to Williamson (1993), this is
the type of trustworthybehavior emphasized in most economic models of exchange and has been most commonly
referred to as a lack of opportunisticbehavior. According
to Cummings and Bromiley (1996), part of the reason we
may trust our partner is that we know that our partner
works within a control system that makes it very hard to
benefit from acting opportunistically.
Economists, then, assume the existence of opportunistic behavior in economic partnerships.Thus, when an organization believes that a partnerengages in opportunistic
behavior, such perceptions will lead to decreased trust.
However, as discussed previously, economic constraints
such as hostages and balanced asset specificity may serve
to decrease the perceived opportunistic behavior of the
partnersby increasing the reliability and predictability of
their behavior. As such, we would expect a positive relationship between these economic constraints and trust
between the partners.
HYPOTHESIS 10. Economic commitments in the form
of balanced asset specificity are positively related to trust
among partners in a strategic alliance.
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HYPOTHESIS 11. Economic commitments in the form
of hostages are positively related to trust among partners
in a strategic alliance.

Dependence and Trust. A primary consequence of
dependence is power. Dependence varies with the value
received (i.e., importance) from a partner and inversely
with the availability of alternative trading partners(Cook
and Emerson 1978). The exercise of power by one partner
(based on dependence of the other) may lead to a partner's acquiescence. However, the continuing exercise of
power to gain acquiescence will promote dysfunctional
conflict and destroy trust (Lusch 1976). As suggested
from the above discussion, the relationship between dependence and trust has been discussed in very negative
terms. Consequently, it is proposed that dependence will
be negatively related to the level of trust between the
partners.
12. Dependence is negatively related to
HYPOTHESIS
trust among partners in a strategic alliance.

Model Specification,Data Collection,
and Research Methods
Model Specification
To test the hypotheses in this study, we specified two
models using the maximum likelihood estimation procedure in LISREL VIII (Joreskog and Sorbom 1993): one
for modification flexibility and anotherfor exit flexibility.
Structural equation modeling techniques are considered
to be a major component of applied multivariate analysis
(Marcoulides 1995). Structuralequation modeling (SEM)
techniques are particularly useful in theory development
because they permit the researcher to propose and subsequently test theoretical propositions about interrelationships among variables in a multivariate setting (Heck et
al. 1990). In its broadest sense, SEM is concerned with
testing complex models for structure of functional relationships between observed variables and latent (hypothetically existing) variables. The functional relationships
are described by parameters that indicate the magnitude
of the effect (either direct or indirect) that independent
variables have on dependent variables. Thus, a structural
model may be viewed as a guide that allows the researcher to assess the relative strength of each variable
included in explaining a desired set of outcomes. The
models tested in this study were posited a priori to examine the specific factors that impact the flexibility of a
strategic alliance in terms of modification and exit.
A structural equation model can be translated in the
LISREL program into a mathematical model with two

ORGANIZATION SCIENCE/VOl.

Strategic Flexibility in IT Alliances

fundamentalparts. The first is known as the measurement
model. This is the model that specifies the relationships
between the observed variables (e.g., four measures of
trust) and the underlying constructs they are hypothesized
to measure, referred to as latent variables (e.g., overall
trust). The second is known as the structuralmodel. The
structuralportion of the model allows the latent constructs
to be tested for relationships that have been theoretically
proposed.
Anderson and Gerbing (1988) suggest the use of a twostage approach to structuralequation modeling. This allows for a more accurate picture of the relationship between the theoretical constructs without it being blurred
with the results of the measurement model. The first stage
is to determine the adequacy of the measurement model
before analyzing the second part of the model, the structural component. Prior studies by Young and Marcoulides
(1997) utilizing this sample found high confirmatoryevidence for the measurement model and the observed latent
constructs utilized in this study. For this study then, we
utilized item parsing by collapsing multi-item measures
to create unidimensional measures representing the latent
construct. As a consequence, the results presented in this
study will emphasize the second stage of structuralequation modeling, the structuralmodel. To construct the various factors presented below (and collectively in Figure 1,
below), the common method of item parcelling (much
like constructing a scale) was used. Item parcelling has
multiple advantages over using individual items as indicators (e.g., Rindskopf and Rose 1988). Of key concern
for the present investigation, parcelling allows for the estimation of fewer parametersin the measurement model,
ensuring that the estimates will be more stable in small
samples (West et al. 1995).
The proposed model specifies factors that together
comprise visible aspects of organizations that influence
strategic alliance flexibility. In this specific case, the outcomes of interest are modification and exit flexibility. The
determinants of modification and exit flexibility are conceptualized on the basis of transaction cost economics
(i.e., asset specificity, balanced asset specificity, hostages)
and social exchange (i.e., trust, dependence) theories. As
recommended by Harris and Schaubroeck (1990), multiple observed indicators were used to measure all of the
latent variables included in the model (see section titled
"Definition and Measurement of the Variables").
Sample
A sample of high technology strategic alliances occurring
during the 1987-1994 period were chosen where at least
one of the partnerswas U.S.-based, the alliance involved
research in the area of information technology (IT), and

10, No. 4, July-August 1999

This content downloaded from 206.211.139.182 on Mon, 10 Nov 2014 12:30:36 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

447

CANDACE YOUNG-YBARRA AND MARGARETHE WIERSEMA

the alliance was either a joint development agreement
(JDA)-two or more firms working together on new technology or products-or a joint research pact (JRP)-the
joint undertaking of research projects with shared resources.
By focusing on IT alliances, this study uses a relatively
homogeneous sample which controls for other external
factors that might impact the relationships being investigated. The selection of IT JRPs and JDAs was chosen
because of the unique nature of their activities and governance. JRPs and JDAs involve a sharing of technology
orjoint development without the joining of the companies
in an equity-type of arrangementsuch as a joint venture.
The unique nature of this sample allows us to focus on
strategic alliances where flexibility is considered to be of
utmost importance given the dynamic nature of technological and competitive change. The uncertainty associated with R&D alliances involving information technology often requires skills, such as flexibility, that may not
be as essential in other types of industries or alliances.
From an initial sample of 291 strategic alliances, a final
sample of 132 alliances involving 241 firms resulted, due
to the elimination of firms wherein data was not available,
the alliances never took place or took on another form
such as a licensing agreement, or there was no key informant. Callbacks and refaxing yielded 91 completed surveys (38% of 241). This response rate is consistent with,
or even greater than, research using survey data to examine interorganizational relationships (e.g., Anderson
and Narus 1990).
Care was taken in this study to ensure that the informants in this sample of alliance partners were selected
properly. However, their knowledge and involvement
were assessed via self-reports, which could be a limitation
of this sample. In particular,some researchershave questioned the ability of key informantsto reportvalidly (e.g.,
Philips 1981), though others (e.g., Brown et al. 1990)
have argued that a single, reliable informant is preferred
over multiple respondents with varying familiarity with
the phenomenon. To overcome this limitation and to be
able to examine the reliability of the responses from the
key informant, a shortened version of the questionnaire
was sent to secondary informants. An analyses of these
questionnaires was conducted to examine the reliability
of the primary respondents and found no significant differences between the primary and secondary respondents
on the measures used in this study. Consequently, the
primary respondent from each company was considered
to be a reliable informant.
Definition and Measurement of the Variables
Table 1 reports the item wording and Cronbach's alphas
for the measures used in this study.
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Strategic Flexibility. For this study, flexibility consists of both the ability to modify the currentrelationship
as well as the ability to exit an alliance performingpoorly.
To measure the first type of strategic flexibility, modification, respondents were asked to rate on a seven-point
Likert-type scale three statements reflecting the partners'
ability to adjust and modify the agreement as needed
(Heide and John 1992). These measures were a reliable
indicator of the first type of flexibility and were collapsed
to form one measure (Cronbach's alpha = 0.81) to be
included in the analysis.
For strategic flexibility as measured by exit, only those
respondents that rated their company' s satisfaction below
the mean (41 firms) were included in the analysis. To
assess flexibility in terms of the relative ease of exit from
an alliance, respondents were asked to rate on a sevenpoint Likert-type scale the probability of their organization terminating the alliance relationship within the next
year. In the case where an organization had already terminated the relationship, they were assigned a "seven."
As suggested by Parkhe (1993), it is important to assess
any possible unanticipated negative or positive consequences of the partnership. Respondents were asked to
rate on a seven-point Likert-type scale any unanticipated
positive or negative outcomes for their company. Additionally, consistent with Harrigan (1988) and Parkhe
(1993), a partner's overall evaluation of the alliance's
performance was obtained by asking informants to rate,
on a seven-point Likert-type scale, two statements reflecting the performance of the alliance. Each was asked to
rate the extent to which the alliance has fulfilled their
organization's expectations and the alliance's effectiveness. These measures were collapsed (Cronbach's alpha
= 0.74) to get one overall assessment of performance.
Asset Specificity. Informantswere asked to categorize
the assets their organization contributed to the alliance
into intangible (administrative personnel and technical
personnel) and tangible (technical equipment, facilities,
and financing). Additionally, respondents were requested
to indicate for all types of assets contributed, the percentage of those assets that could easily be transferredfor
use elsewhere. These two sets of measures were collapsed
into one: the degree of asset specificity (for both intangible and tangible assets) in the alliance.
Balanced Asset Specificity. Balanced asset specificity
represents the degree to which the partnersin the alliance
have invested equivalent specific assets into the relationship. Respondents were asked to indicate the reciprocal
assets invested by their partner in the same manner as
above. A calculation was made to compare the balance
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Table 1

Strategic Flexibility in IT Alliances

Measurement Instruments

Measures and Items
Strategic Flexibility:Modification (Scale 1-7: Strongly Disagree-Strongly Agree)**
1. When an unexpected situation arises, the parties would rather modify the agreement than hold each other to the original terms.
2. Flexibility in response to requests for changes is a characteristic of this alliance.
3. The parties expect to be to make adjustments in the ongoing relationship to cope with changing circumstances.
Strategic Flexibility:Exit
1. What is the probability of your company terminating this alliance within the next year? (Scale 1-7: Very Low-Very High)
2. Performance**
Alliances often result in unexpected outcomes. Some can be negative (e.g., leakage of proprietary information)while others
may be positive (e.g., development of unanticipated new market). To what extent has this alliance resulted in:
a. unanticipated positive outcomes for your company? (Scale 1-7: Not at All-Extensively)
b. unanticipated negative outcomes for your company? (Scale 1-7: Not at All-Extensively)*
c. fulfilled expectations? (Scale 1-7: Not at All Satisfied-Completely Satisfied)
d. overall effectiveness (Scale 1-7: Not At All Satisfied-Completely Satisfied)

Cronbach's
alpha
0.81

0.74

Asset Specificity
1. Which of the following assets has your company dedicated specifically to this alliance? (Yes/No)
a. Intangible assets (Administrative Personnel and Technical Personnel)
b. Tangible assets (Technical Equipment, Facilities, and Financing)
2. If yes, were the alliance to dissolve today, what percentage of each of your company's assets could be transferred for
use elsewhere?
Balanced Asset Specificity
1. Which of the following assets has your partner company dedicated specifically to this alliance? (Yes/No)
a. Intangible assets (Administrative Personnel and Technical Personnel)
b. Tangible assets (Technical Equipment, Facilities, and Financing)
2. Ifyes, were the alliance to dissolve today, what percentage of each of your partner company's assets could be transferred for use elsewhere?
Hostages (Yes/No)
1. Currently,which of the following types of relationships does your company have with your partner company?
* Trade Association Membership
* Contracting/Licensing
* Manufacturing/MarketingJoint Ventures
* R&DJoint Ventures
* R&D Consortia
* Other (Yes/No)
Trust (Scale 1-7: Strongly Disagree-Strongly Agree)**
1. When we encounter difficult and new circumstances, my company does not feel worried or threatened by letting our
partner company do what it wants.
2. My company is familiarwith the patterns of behavior our partner company has established, and we can rely on them to
behave in certain ways.
3. We have found that our partner company is unusually dependable.
4. Our partner company cannot be trusted at times.*

0.86

Power/Dependence: Influence (Scale 1-7:No Influence-A Great Deal of Influence)**
1. How much influence does your company have, relative to that of your partner company, on the following decisions?
a. Alliance goals
b. Alliance operating decisions
c. Budget allocations
d. Selection of research projects

0.82
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Table 1 (Continued)

Measurement Instruments
Cronbach's
alpha

Measures and Items
Power/Dependence: Alternatives
1. Does your company currently conduct the same activities conducted by this alliance in any of the following arrangements? (Yes/No)
* Internally
* Licensing
* Joint Venture
* Other Types of Alliances
2. If no for any, please indicate your company's potential for using these arrangements for conducting the alliance's activities. (Scale 1-7: Low Potential-High Potential)*
Power/Dependence: Importance
1. The nature of the activities conducted by this alliance are similar/dissimilar to your company's primary focus? (Scale 17: Similar-Dissimilar)
Previous Relationships
1. Has your company previously been engaged with your partner company in other alliances? (Yes/No)
2. If yes, how many years did the previous alliance last?
Attachment
1. How long has your company been involved in this alliance? (Measured in months)
Communication (Scale 1-7: Strongly Disagree-Strongly Agree)**
1. We always keep each other informed about events or changes that may affect the other party.
2. It is expected that any informationthat might help the other party will be provided to them.
3. It is expected that proprietary informationwill be shared if it can help the other party.
4. Exchange of information in this alliance takes place frequently and informally, not only according to a prespecified
agreement.

0.89

Shared Values (Scale 1-7: Strongly Disagree-Strongly Agree)**
1. Our goals and objectives for this alliance are shared by our partner company.
2. Our partner company had similar motives for forming this alliance.

0.91

*Reverse Coded
**Reliabilityindicated for these multiple-item measures.

of asset specificity for both intangible and tangible investments by taking the absolute difference of the partners' specific assets invested. Here, a "zero" indicated a
perfectly balanced set of investments.
Hostages. Similar to Kogut (1989), hostages was operationalized as concurrent relationships that an organization has, in addition to the focal alliance, with their
partner organization. Informants were asked to specify
which of five types of relationships their organization
concurrently had with their partnercompany. If any concurrent relationship existed between the partners then a
hostage arrangementbetween the partnerswas considered
to exist and was coded as a "one." When no hostage arrangement existed, a code of "zero" was used.
Trust. Measures of trust were drawn from the literature on both interpersonal trust (Johnson-George and
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Swap 1982, Larzelere and Houston 1980, McAllister
1995) and interorganizationaltrust (Anderson and Narus
1990, Morgan and Hunt, 1994). After modifying the
statements to reflect the nature of the alliance activity,
respondents were asked to rate, on seven-point Likerttype scale, four statements reflecting their organization's
trust in their partner organization. These measures reflected the three components of trust used in much of the
interpersonal trust literature (i.e., dependability, predictability, and faith). The measures were collapsed to reflect
one overall measure of trust for inclusion in the model
(Cronbach's Alpha = 0.86).
Power/Dependence. Using the definition of dependence suggested by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), our measure of power/dependence is composed of three elements:
(1) the influence in the use of the resource, (2) the absence
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of alternatives, both currentand potential, and (3) the importance of the resource being obtained. To measure influence, respondents were asked to rate on a seven-point
Likert-type scale four statements concerning their organization' s influence over the following alliance decisions:
goals, operating decisions, budget allocations, and the selection of research projects. These measures were collapsed into one measure of influence to be included in the
model (Cronbach's Alpha = 0.82)
To measure the absence of alternatives, respondents
were asked whether their organization was currently able
to conduct the alliance activities in any of four alternative
arrangements and they were asked to rate on a sevenpoint Likert-type scale their organization's potential for
conducting these activities (if they weren't already doing
so).
Importance of the resource being obtained was conceptualized in terms of the criticality of the resource. A
resource is considered critical when that resource is a key
part of the focal organization's operations or function or
to the extent to which the organization requires it for
operation or continued survival (Blau 1964, Emerson,
1962, Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) Thus the alliance will
be more critical, and therefore more important,to the organization when the alliance is conducting research that
is directly related to the organization's primary research
interests.
Previous Relationships. Consistent with Gulati
(1995) and Anderson and Weitz (1989), respondents were
asked whether or not their organization had previously
partnered with their current partner. Additionally, this
study included another element by asking how long the
relationship(s) lasted. The importance of this additional
element is clear. A previous short-lived alliance may not
have the desired effect as some researchers assume (i.e.,
increased trust) but may actually act to decrease the trust
if the alliance was dissolved prematurely.
Attachment. Attachment refers to the length of the
currentrelationship. Using the same operationalizationof
attachment as Seabright et al. (1992), respondents were
asked to indicate how long (in months) their organization
had been involved in the focal alliance.
Communication. The quality of the communication
between partnersto an exchange is related to the trustthat
develops in that relationship (Moorman et al. 1993). Consequently, respondents were asked to rate on a sevenpoint Likert-type scale four statementsreflecting the quality of communication between the organizations. These
measures are consistent with those used by marketing
channels researchers (e.g., Heide and John 1992, Mohr
and Spekman 1994). Preliminary analyses indicated that
these four measures of communication quality were
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highly related (Cronbach's alpha = 0.89); hence, for further analysis in the overall model, they were collapsed
into one variable: communication.
Shared Values. Two separate aspects of this construct
were measured. First, consistent with Gulati (1995), we
categorize the alliance as either multinationalor domestic
(1 = all partners from the U.S., 0 = multinational alliance). Consistent with previous research examining the
relationship between shared values and trust (Morgan and
Hunt 1994), it was requested that the respondent rate on
a seven-point Likert-type scale their organization's agreement concerning two statements reflecting the degree to
which the partners have a common understanding of the
motives for joining, and the goals and objectives of the
alliance. These two statements were highly correlated
(Cronbach's alpha = 0.91) and were combined into one
variable: shared goals. Consequently, the construct shared
values is composed of both shared nationality and shared
goals.

Findings
Table 2 shows the means and standarddeviations for the
measures used in this model.
Assessment of the Structural Model
Figure 1 (modification flexibility) and Figure 2 (exit flexibility) are the a priori structuralmodels we tested, with
significant parametervalues indicated. The full results of
the structuralmodels are reported in Tables 3 and 4. The
parameterestimates are indices that represent the simultaneous contribution of each latent variable to the model.
Also included are the error terms for the structuralequations. In standardized form, error coefficients represent
the proportionof variance in each equation not accounted
for in the structuralmodel. The errorcoefficient for modification flexibility is 0.26 and 0.37 for exit flexibility.
Because our models were defined a priori, our primary
interest is in the model fit. Once the model fit is determined, the significance of the various parameterestimates
can be ascertained (Marcoulides 1989). Without a significant model fit, however, we would have to reconceptualize our models. The assessment of the fit of the models
is revealed by examining the goodness of fit index (GFI
= 0.93 for modification and 0.90 for exit), the adjusted
goodness of fit index (AGFI = 0.90 for modification and
0.88 for exit), and the normed index (NFI = 0.95 for
modification and 0.92 for exit). It is generally recognized
that GFI, AGFI, and NFI values above 0.90 indicate a
satisfactory model fit. For these models, these indices all
suggest a good model fit. Because the models were determined to fit the data reasonably well, we can now assess more thoroughly the significance of the empirical
validation of our hypotheses.
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Table 2

Descriptive Statistics and Correlations Among Constructs

Construct
Strategic Flexibility
1. Modification
2. Exit

Mean S.D.

4.24
4.37

1.66
1.97

1

2

Social Exchange Theory
8. Trust
9. Influence
10. Alternatives
11. Importance
12. Previous Relations
13. Attachment
14. Communication
15. Shared Values

4.09
3.88
3.19
4.32
5.12
52.46
4.79
4.82

1.44
1.42
2.04
1.84
3.31
36.20
1.50
1.53

3

4

5

6

0.26
0.12

0.08

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

0.20

Transaction Cost Economics
3. Asset Specificity-Intangible 36.41 25.14 -0.37 -0.63
4. Asset Specificity-Tangible
29.2522.36 -0.33 -0.31
5. Balanced Asset SpecificityIntangible
28.78 13.31 0.42 0.13
6. Balanced Asset Specificity32.2422.11
Tangible
0.14 0.19
7. Hostages
0.84 0.37 0.55 0.11

0.69 0.47
0.40 0.06
0.13 0.32
0.07 0.45
0.11 -0.27
0.34 -0.44
0.60 0.51
0.71 0.42

0.19
0.18

0.24

0.19
0.22

0.21
0.17

-0.02
0.11 0.33 0.29 0.46
-0.13 -0.14 -0.08
0.09 0.07 0.40
0.07 0.18 0.13 0.19 -0.01 0.15 0.08
0.02 0.08 0.09 0.13 -0.240.11
0.10 0.12
0.21 0.270.17
0.06 0.10 -0.01
0.11 -0.13 -0.28
-0.01
0.05 0.03 -0.06
0.090.04 -0.01 -0.07
0.05 -0.22
-0.14
0.04 -0.23 -0.16
0.35 0.79 0.18 0.04 -0.17
0.17 0.09
0.21 0.02 0.17 0.51 0.77 0.28 0.08 -0.15
-0.16
0.21 -0.040.46

Assessment of the HypothesizedRelationships
Influence of Transaction Cost Economics. As shown in
Figures 1 and 2, the results for transactioncost economic
theory show mixed results. Contrary to Hypothesis la,
asset specificity is negatively related to strategic flexibility of the alliance, measured in terms of modification.
Additionally, asset specificity is negatively related to the
strategic flexibility of the alliance, measured in terms of
exit, providing support for Hypothesis lb.
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, balanced asset specificity (intangible assets) is positively related to the strategic
flexibility of an alliance, measured in terms of modification. This result provides support for the role of mutual
commitments in providing an incentive to maintain the
relationship through modification or mutual adjustment.
Additionally, this supports the previous discussion that
suggested intangible assets are more likely to provide an
even stronger lock-in to the relationship than tangible assets.
For the relationship between hostages and strategic
flexibility, results indicate that the existence of hostage
arrangementswas positively related to strategic flexibility
of the alliance, measured in terms of modification, thus
confirming Hypothesis 3a. However, we found no support
for Hypothesis 3b in which we proposed a negative relationship between the existence of hostages and strategic
flexibility, measured in terms of exit.
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Influence of Social Exchange Theory. Factors suggested by social exchange theory have a significant influence on strategic flexibility. Trust is significant and positively related to modification flexibility, strongly
supporting Hypothesis 4a. Likewise, we found a significant and positive relationship between trust and flexibility, measured in terms of exit, providing strong support
for Hypothesis 4b.
The results for the role of dependence on the flexibility
of an alliance provide strong support for Hypotheses 5a
and 5b, which proposed that dependence is negatively
related to strategic flexibility in terms of modification
(Hypothesis 5a) and exit (Hypothesis 5b). Two of the
three measures of dependence, influence and alternatives,
were significant and negatively related to modification
flexibility, while alternatives and importance were significant and negatively related to flexibility, measured in
terms of exit. The six significant links affirm the importance of social exchange theory factors in influencing
strategic flexibility in alliances.
Sources of Trust
Social Exchange Theory and Trust. In examining
sources of trust in terms of social exchange theory, the
findings indicate that communication and shared values
were significant factors influencing trust. Previous relations and attachment, however, were not significantly re-
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Figure 1

Strategic Flexibility in IT Alliances
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lated to trust, disproving Hypothesis 6, in which it was
proposed that the existence of previous relationships with
the current partner(s) would be positively related to trust
among partners in a strategic alliance. Attachment was
also found not to be related to trust. In other words, the
length of time that partner organizations have been together had little or no impact on the trust developed between the organizations. This is inconsistent with predictions in Hypothesis 7. The results indicate support for

Hypothesis 8. The level and quality of communication
between the partner organizations was found to be positively related to trust in the partnercompany. Hypothesis
9 was confirmed in the analysis. The shared values between the organizations was found to be positively related
to trust.
Transaction Cost Economics and Trust. Results of
the proposed relationships among the theoretical determinants of flexibility revealed an interesting set of
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Figure 2

Structural Model of Exit Flexibility
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interrelationships.In examining the relationship between
factors suggested by transactioncost economics and trust,
as shown in both Figures 1 and 2, we found a positive
relationship between three factors suggested from transaction cost economic theory-balanced asset specificity
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(both tangible and intangible), hostages, and trust. This
provides support for Hypotheses 10 and 11, which proposed a positive relationship between economic commitments in the form of balanced asset specificity and hostages and trustbetween the partnersin a strategic alliance.
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Dependence and Trust. The results examining the relationship between dependence and trust provide support
for Hypothesis 12, which proposed a negative relationship between dependence and trust. Specifically, a negative relationship was found between one specific measure of dependence, influence on decision making in the
alliance, and trust between the partners.

Discussion
Exploring the influence of transactioncost economics and
social exchange theory on the strategic flexibility of alliances involving joint research pacts and joint development agreements showed that, in general, factors from
transaction cost economics provided flexibility in modification but not in exit. Generally, trust was found to be
positively related to flexibility while the other component
of social exchange theory, dependence, was found to be
negatively related to the strategic flexibility of the alliance.
This study found mixed support for the role of transaction cost economics in the strategic flexibility of an
alliance. The investment of specific assets, both tangible
and intangible, was found to have a detrimental impact
on the strategic flexibility of alliance relationships. This
provides evidence of the inertia or lock-in associated with
the commitment of resources that have little or no use in
other settings and is consistent with results found by researchers examining forces leading to continuity in the
relationship. However, when the assets contributed by
both parties are considered, a different result is found.
When both parties have equivalent specific assets at stake,
they are likely to strive to modify the arrangementto keep
it going. And yet, when the alliance does not satisfy the
partner, these assets will serve to lock the partners into
the relationship. Previous research has not adequately explored this construct, which is unique to dyadic relationships. The significant results indicate that it is important
to consider both partners' contributions. The relative importance of the assets contributed may serve to align the
interests of the parties involved. This alignment of interests cannot be determined by looking at only one side of
the assets contributed. Similarly, hostages, which have
been described as anothertype of economic commitment,
will provide flexibility in modifying the arrangement,but
no significant relationship was found with regard to exit
barriers. Thus, while mutual economic hostages, in the
form of specific assets or current relationships with the
partner,encourage partnersto modify the currentarrangement to protect their investments, the flexibility to exit is
not provided. This last finding is in direct contrast with
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Table 3

Parameter Estimates for Structural Model of
Modification Flexibility (Figure 1)

Following/Leading Constructs

Hypothesized Standardized
Sign
Solution
t-value

Modification Flexibility
Asset specificity (Intangible)
Asset specificity (Tangible)
Balanced asset specificity
(Intangible)
Balanced asset specificity
(Tangible)
Hostages
Trust
Dependence
Influence
Alternatives
Importance

+
+
+

-0.29
-0.25
0.31

3.23**
2.83**
3.84**

+

0.11

1.01

+
+

0.47
0.60

4.49***
5.35***

-0.32
-0.27
0.15

3.912**
3.01 1**
1.74

+
+
+
+
+

0.14
0.04
0.51
0.62
0.28

1.59
0.48
4.87***
5.62***
3.1 1**

+

0.24

2.793*

+

0.49

4.72***

- 0.31
0.12
0.09

3.839**
1.22
0.90

Trust
Previous Relations
Attachment
Communication
Shared Values
Balanced asset specificity
(Intangible)
Balanced asset specificity
(Tangible)
Hostages
Dependence
Influence
Alternatives
Importance
***p < 0.001
**p < 0.01
*p < 0.05

Kogut (1989), who found a positive relationship between
the existence of hostages and the continuation of the focal
alliance. However, Kogut (1989) did not examine continuation in terms of flexibility to exit the relationship when
it may no longer satisfy the partner,but ratherconsidered
total exiting firms.
Strong relationships were found for the role of social
exchange theory in explaining the flexibility of an alliance. Trust was found to be related to flexibility in modifying the current arrangement and even in exiting a
poorly performing alliance. This result is consistent with
those researchers who have argued for the role of trust in
developing adaptable arrangements. Here, adaptability
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may go so far as to allow partnersto dissolve the current
relationship in favor of a later more effective arrangement.
Consistent with arguments in the literature on dependence, this study found a negative relationship between
a partner's dependence on the alliance and the flexibility
of the alliance. Specifically, fewer alternatives for conducting the alliance's activities and low influence in decision making were related to lower flexibility. This result
is consistent with Harriganand Newman (1990), who argued that alternatives reduce dependence on any one
course of action and that firms may incur additional expenses to keep these alternatives open.
In examining the various sources of trust suggested by
transaction cost economics and social exchange theory,
this study found that trust, or the predictability of one's
behaviour, is associated with the level of economic commitments in the form of balanced assets invested and hostages. In other words, partnerswith similar assets at stake,
and those with other currentrelationships with their partner, are more likely to be able to rely on the behavior of
their partner. This is consistent with Cummings and
Bromiley (1996), who argue that incentive and control
systems constrict the behavior of the partners, thereby
producing a trusting relationship. Likewise, as suggested
by social exchange theory, the quality of communication
and the existence of shared values between the partners
is positively related to trust. This type of trust is similar
to the "strong form" discussed by Barney and Hansen
(1995).
In summary, it is important to understand the implications of the various theories in addressing flexibility.
Consistent with transaction cost theory, as well as evidenced in many currentalliances, commitments, or longlived alliances are often manipulated by demanding high
mutual investment of resources, by involving
relationship-specific assets, or by taking other economic
"hostages" (Williamson 1985). However, these findings
suggest that economic commitments may tend to create
organization inertia and undermine autonomy and flexibility. Consequently, asset specificity and dependence
may need to be minimal in certain relationships because
of the desirability to have highly versatile and flexible
alliances, particularly in very uncertain environments.
Thus, the flexible strategic alliance may need to make less
use of capital and resource dependencies to obtain commitment and may instead rely on trust in structuringthe
relationship, as social exchange theory suggests.
This study makes several contributions to the literature
on the effective use of strategic alliances for competing
in uncertain and turbulentenvironments. First, this study
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Table 4

Parameter Estimates for Structural Model of Exit
Flexibility (Figure 2)

Following/Leading Constructs

Hypothesized Standardized
Sign
Solution
t-value

Exit Flexibility
Asset specificity (Intangible)
Asset specificity (Tangible)
Hostages
Trust
Dependence
Influence
Alternatives
Importance
Trust
Previous Relations
Attachment
Communication
Shared Values
Balanced asset specificity
(Intangible)
Balanced asset specificity
(Tangible)
Hostages
Dependence:
Influence
Alternatives
Importance

- 0.50
-0.24
0.09
0.35

4.53***
2.61*
0.79
3.89**

0.08
-0.27
-0.40

0.71
2.73**
4.34***

+
+
+
+
+

0.12
0.05
0.53
0.61
0.29

1.03
0.44
4.79***
5.21***
3.01**

+

0.23

2.42*

+

0.51

4.60***

+
-

-

-

-0.30
0.11
0.10

3.15**
0.91
0.79

***p < 0.001
**p < 0.01
*p < 0.05

utilizes factors from both transaction cost economic theory and social exchange theory to provide a more thorough understanding of flexibility in strategic alliances.
Secondly, this study is the first to examine strategic flexibility in a setting involving two important and widely
used types of strategic alliances, joint development agreements and joint research pacts. Additionally, it is the first
to examine two important dimensions of strategic flexibility in alliances, the ability to modify the arrangement
and the ability to exit the relationship when the alliance
is performing poorly. Finally, this study examines importantinterrelationshipsamong the determinantsof flexibility suggested by transactioncost economics and social
exchange theory. Specifically, it explores the sources of
trust, or trusting behavior, suggested by both transaction
cost economic theory and social exchange theory.
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